

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE FOR EXCHANGE OF  
GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File

6 August 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC)

SUBJECT: Status Report on Progress of Ad Hoc Subcommittee for  
Exchange of Guided Missile Intelligence Information

1. The Ad Hoc Subcommittee for Exchange of Guided Missile Intelligence Information feels that it has reached the point of vanishing returns and that continued operation in the same manner as heretofore is not recommended and will no longer be profitable. For more analysis of the information exchange problem, there must be either a large scale expansion of the investigation or alternately the individual services must be apprised of our tentative conclusions and requested to institute investigation and corrective measures of their own.

2. Our tentative conclusion, partially expressed in our status report of 13 January, may be summarized as follows:

a. The flow of information is generally satisfactory in all areas except basic information--intermediate between raw data and assessment.

b. If shown to be desirable, substantial improvement can be made in the lateral flow of basic information prior to exhaustive assessment by the parent agency.

3. Let's consider first if it is desirable to improve the flow of this basic information.

a. Some may feel that an agency which collects information is entitled, like a newspaper, to make its own assessment and publish the combination before it releases the basic information to the rest of the community.

b. Some may feel that a collecting agency is entitled to conduct an extensive evaluation of the collection system, releasing only selected assessments, until it judges the system can stand on its own feet.

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c. Some may feel a collecting agency is entitled to release more for "internal use only" than for community consumption.

4. The Subcommittee's feeling on this subject is divided. One view is that the factors mentioned will always prevent the free flow of information, and that it is neither practicable nor desirable to alter this situation. If this view prevails, the Subcommittee may be dissolved immediately with its accomplishment limited to the minor information exchanges already accomplished during the course of the meetings. Another view is that there is a way to remove the fundamental objections stated above, consistent with the immediate release of all basic intelligence information. The gain of such a course is believed to exceed by far the losses. The gain consists of exposing the basic information to the combined capabilities of the entire intelligence community before a published assessment prejudices judgement, and makes necessary a resource-consuming debate. By judicious policies, the loss can be made trivial. For example:

a. An agency which collects raw data and translates it into basic information should be satisfied with the "newspaper-beat" that will be accorded it at this stage rather than jeopardize its position by withholding it from the community for an assessment that does not include consideration of a vital element held by another agency.

b. An agency which collects information from an unproven system can include all the preliminary precautions felt to be necessary and so maintain its integrity and still release immediately information that may be useful to complement or degrade information held by another agency.

c. An agency which retains basic information for "internal use only" should be satisfied with its improved position by virtue of much background information acquired in collection.

5. If CMIC will agree that improvements are desirable, if practicable, there are only two possible ways of achieving this improvement.

a. Instruct the Subcommittee (or any group) to conduct a thorough examination of the situation. This will probably involve the full time efforts of the committee for three months, and the free cooperation of all member agencies in briefing this committee on information collected by systems not yet contributing to the full intelligence community. Subsequent to this massive collection of facts, the Subcommittee can properly accomplish its mission and an informed recommendation for improvement can be made.

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b. The alternate way to achieve the improvement is for the Subcommittee to prepare letters from GMIC to all the collection and dissemination agencies requesting their cooperation in a voluntary program to improve the lateral flow of basic information. The agencies should be requested to reconsider policies which may be completely justified in their primary function but may have a side effect injurious to the free flow of information and not compatible with maximum gain from the information.

6. We believe the latter alternative above is practicable. It is requested that GMIC advise the Subcommittee as to the proper future course of action.

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Chairman

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REVISED MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR  
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE FOR EXCHANGE OF  
GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

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CIA

Major S. Matthews, Army

Dr. Robert C. Wycoff, Navy ✓  
Lt. Dale Perry, Alternate ✓

Major Kenneth Verhagen, Air Force ✓  
Captain William Boyd, Alternate

Colonel Robert H. Stumpf, Joint Staff ✓  
(designed member, has not been able to attend)

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